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goodness seems to me to result from what may be described as his statical conception of the Absolute. Goodness evidently belongs to the process of spiritual life, to the struggle towards the ideal of perfect harmony; and if the Absolute exists only in a state of repose, goodness must suffer the condemnation of all mere appearance. But if it is the nature of the Absolute to reveal itself in a spiritual process, goodness may perhaps claim to be its highest manifestation. At any rate, it does not seem to be proved that the ideal to which goodness points involves any ineradicable vice.

This review cannot but be felt to be miserably inadequate to the work criticised; but enough has probably been said to make it apparent that the book is one of supreme interest and importance to the student of ethics as well as to the student of metaphysics. I could have wished to add something on several other points, such as the doctrine of immortality, the relation of religion to morals, the significance of art, etc., on all of which Mr. Bradley has some very interesting remarks; but I must content myself with commending his discussions on these subjects to the attention of philosophical students. I may say, generally, of Mr. Bradley's book (parodying one of his own oracular utterances) that the work as a whole is unsatisfactory, but every particular thing in it is most delightful. The style, though often paradoxical, is singularly bright and attractive. It is hardly too much to say that the book is altogether the most important independent work on metaphysics that has ever been written in English.

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ETHICS. An Introductory Manual for the Use of University Students. By F. Ryland, M.A., author of "A Hand-book of Psychology," etc. London: George Bell & Sons, 1893. Pp. x, 220.

This book contains chapters on the Scope and Method of Ethics; on Good, Happiness, and Perfection; on Right, Obligation, and Duty; Hedonistic and Intuitionist Theories; Ethical Psychology; the Relation of Ethics to Theology and Law; and the Classification of Virtues. The final chapter gives a brief sketch of English Ethical Theories; and the book concludes with a useful bibliographical appendix, and a reprint of the ethical questions in the London Pass Papers from 1883 to 1892. The general arrangement

is good, and the expositions of ethical doctrine, though sometimes superficial, are frequently clear and vigorous.

The object of the author, as announced in the preface, is to provide a hand-book of ethics suited to students preparing for the Pass Examination of the University of London. But this hand-book is not a mere reproduction of the views of accepted ethical authorities, for the writer has strong (though not always consistent) views of his own. He rejects utilitarianism and all categorical imperatives, and advocates a treatment of ethics which is rather æsthetic than scientific.

Mr. Ryland's book is thus both better and worse than a mere manual: better, because more vivid than if it were simply a colorless repetition of other men's doctrines; worse (I think), because his own opinions, though held with conviction, have not been thoroughly thought out, and therefore both some criticisms of the ethical systems which he refuses, and also the statement of his own view, are deficient in clearness and in insight. For instance, some of his strictures on utilitarianism proceed on distinct misunderstanding; as where he objects to the Benthamite "Greatest Happiness" axiom, on the assumption that it regards all men as having "the same capacity for pleasure and pain." Again, the suggestion conveyed in his remark that "to the genuine utilitarian, rightness is a *proprium* of the useful action" (and other remarks to the same effect) is highly misleading, since for the utilitarian (as for every other) moralist, the *first* question is, *What is right?* And Mr. Ryland's account of the relation between ethical and psychological hedonism is not as clear as might be desired; in fact, his whole treatment of pleasure and desire appears to be very much wanting in grasp and accuracy. The criticism of Hedonistic doctrine on p. 32 may be especially mentioned as involving confusion of thought and expression, and misapprehension of the doctrine criticised. Again, he insists strongly on the impossibility of a Hedonic calculus, but on p. 70 is enabled by means of it to arrive at a very decided conclusion.

When Mr. Ryland proceeds to find fault with utilitarianism on account of its vagueness, one cannot help wondering; not so much because utilitarianism is, in fact, comparatively definite, as because the æsthetic view, which he inclines to, is—as he describes it—essentially vague, and this very vagueness seems to be regarded by him as a merit. He says (p. 38), "The natural instinct of good men seems to assume that the various kinds of human perfection,

although rivals, are yet not absolutely exclusive of each other. . . . If this be so, we may have to do away with the idea of a *summum bonum* altogether (unless we can find one which shall embrace all three), and substitute for it the conception of a cycle of ends, a self-supporting system of goods." We have "no absolute principles," and "the ultimate end of reasonable conduct cannot be absolutely determined;" "we are to take a purely relative view of the meaning of *obligation* and of *right*;" "there remains no categorical imperative;" "we are under no necessity to regard the moral precepts as rules." All this is somewhat vague and incoherent; it does not promise either a satisfying theory or useful practical guidance; and its acceptance seems to leave us—whether as moralists or as plain men—rather badly off. When it is said to be questionable "whether the highest kind of morality is compatible with ethical codification," we may indeed admit that in conduct, as in art, what is most perfect and most beautiful cannot by mere observance of rules, or even by strenuous pursuit of an ideal, be reached by all,—in fact, some transcendent power of will or insight or imagination is needed for the production of masterpieces either in art or in life. And in drawing analogies between art and morality it is important to remember that, while no man is called on to paint pictures or compose music unless he has genius, every man is bound to live a good life; and though rules of art—of harmony, of perspective, etc.—are not *enough* to insure artistic excellence, yet they are *indispensable*. Rules are not everything, but good rules are a good deal.

The æsthetic view leaves us without definite rules or a definite end, and without any common measure of ethical value; and it seems to me to be but a poor substitute for even the inconsistent and defective morality which common sense unreflectingly accepts. And Mr. Ryland does not hold to it unflinchingly, for he sometimes seems to agree with Kant that the only good is a good will, and at other times maintains that it is the object of desire that is the good.

Still, in spite of its faults, this hand-book is, on the whole, above the average in merit. It has a certain completeness of form and is free from irrelevancies, the style is bright, and it is the work of an instructed and earnest, if perhaps somewhat hasty, thinker.

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